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Reflections on Bagwell and Staiger in Light of the Revised WTO 







  Bagwell and Stager (2011) is, in my view, a thoughtful and penetrating analysis that 
poses important questions for the WTO and all who support its work.  In addition to several 
other interesting findings, it posits a need to revisit traditional approaches to the provision of 
special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries in WTO negotiations.  This 
merits careful reflection by scholars and practitioners.  In this comment, I shall reflect on 
aspects of Bagwell and Staiger's analysis in light of the approach to SDT in the revised WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).  Arguably, the latter represents an 
alternative paradigm for SDT that avoids some or all of the problems that Bagwell and 
Staiger put forward concerning the traditional approach.  The modernization of the GPA is, in 
any case, an important development in its own right with clear relevance to the overall 
themes of the NBER-Bank of England conference:  hence, before concluding, I shall briefly 
relate some key aspects of interest. 
 
(1)  Overview of the Authors' Key Findings 
 
  Three main propositions are advanced by Bagwell and Staiger in their analysis.  First, 
they argue that "non-reciprocal" SDT (i.e. SDT that exempts the recipient countries from 
making concessions that are proportionate to the market access benefits that they receive) is, 
contrary to all intentions, harmful to the interests of developing countries, in that it does not 
help them to re-structure their economies, change their terms of trade and become more 
competitive.  This, the authors suggest, accounts in significant measure for the oft-repeated 
perception that many developing countries have not benefited from participation in the WTO.  
Second, the authors suggest that, after fifty years of successful liberalization under the 
GATT/WTO, developed economies suffer from both "globalization fatigue" and inadequate 
bargaining power vis-à-vis new developing country entrants, in terms of additional 
concessions that can be offered in return for meaningful reductions in market access barriers 
on the new entrants' part.  This is the "latecomers problem".  Third, Bagwell and Staiger 
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argue that, to address these problems and meaningfully integrate developing countries into 
the multilateral trading system, non-reciprocal SDT must be abandoned; developing countries 
must come to the table in markets where they are large; and they must negotiate reciprocal 
market access concessions with both developed countries and each other. 
 
The foregoing propositions of Bagwell and Staiger demand careful reflection.  They 
raise important questions about the design and modalities of current efforts to integrate 
developing countries into the multilateral trading system.  They also run contrary to 
assumptions held by many such countries about their own interests, and to efforts to improve 
the structure of the WTO from a "moral" point of view (i.e. to make it more overtly favorable 
to and supportive of the interests of developing countries).  In effect, Bagwell and Staiger 
argue that the benefits to be realized by developing countries from participation in the WTO 
system will be commensurate with the sacrifices that they are willing to make in terms of 
opening access to their own markets, not for reasons of morality but because it is only by 
opening their markets that they will undergo the restructuring that is necessary to strengthen 
the competitiveness of their own industries.  The authors' account is buttressed by a general 
equilibrium modelling exercise and by reference to recent empirical studies supporting the 
view that a country's own tariffs and other import barriers are often a principal barrier to the 
country's export-competitiveness.  These arguments and evidence merit scrutiny and 
reflection by academics and trade policy practitioners alike.  Overall, Bagwell and Staiger's is 
not a case that will be universally welcomed, but it is a case that urgently needs to be heard 
and assessed. 
 
(2)  The S&D Provisions of the GPA as an Alternative Paradigm 
 
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), a plurilateral agreement 
within the WTO system, is in the process of being renegotiated.  The GPA renegotiation is 
not part of the Doha Round Single Undertaking; rather, it has been undertaken pursuant to a 
separate mandate that was built into the Agreement when it was adopted in 1994, and is 
proceeding on an independent track.  Reciprocity of market access commitments is an 
important consideration in the negotiations (see WTO Committee on Government 
Procurement 2004).  The renegotiation is now in its final stages.  The expected outcomes 
from the negotiations include a complete revision to the text of the Agreement and an 3 
 
expansion of the underlying market access commitments, which are embodied in schedules to 
the Agreement (see, generally, Anderson and Arrowsmith 2011).
 
 
The revised GPA text, which is already agreed in principle and is in the public domain 
(see WTO Committee on Government Procurement 2010), embodies an alternative paradigm 
for special and differential treatment particularly in the context of negotiations regarding 
accessions to the Agreement.  Arguably, this alternative approach avoids most or all of the 
problems identified by Bagwell and Staiger (2011) in regard to more traditional approaches. 
 
The key differences between SDT as it applies under the revised GPA text and more 
traditional approaches to SDT in the WTO are as follows.  First, rather than a general 
presumption in favour of non-reciprocity in market access commitments, under the revised 
GPA text SDT principally takes the form of specific "transitional measures" that are intended 
to facilitate implementation of the Agreement by acceding developing country Parties.
2  
Second, such measures are not available "as of right" but are to be awarded on the basis of 
specific developmental needs of the acceding WTO Member and subject to agreement by the 
other Parties.  Third, such SDT as may be awarded is clearly intended to be time-bound.   
Fourth, and very significantly in relation to the Bagwell-Staiger critique, the relevant 
provisions of the revised GPA text explicitly take into account reciprocity concerns.  In 
particular, the relevant provisions stipulate that the market access opportunities available to 
acceding Parties are "subject to any terms negotiated between [other Parties] and the 
developing country in order to maintain an appropriate balance of opportunities under this 
Agreement".  This effectively enables reciprocity to be maintained notwithstanding any 
transitional measures that may be negotiated (see, for a comprehensive discussion, Müller 
2011). 
 
  Of course, ultimately, the extent of a GPA Party's market access commitments is a 
matter to be determined by negotiation.  In that regard, it is instructive to note that, in 
discussions on China's accession to the GPA, which is currently being negotiated, the existing 
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GPA Parties have made clear their expectation that China will eventually offer a range of 
commitments that is comparable to that of other Parties under the Agreement (see WTO, 
Committee on Government Procurement 2009, paragraph 17).  This underscores the 
continuing importance of reciprocity considerations in such negotiations. 
 
(3)  The GPA and the broader themes of the conference 
 
  Current developments concerning the GPA are of interest not only in regard to the specific 
findings of Bagwell and Staiger (2011) but also in relation to the broader themes of the conference - 
i.e., globalization and related institutional arrangements in an age of crisis.  The current 
international environment poses, at a minimum, three inter-related challenges for all 
governments in relation to the public procurement sector:  (i)  maintaining and, where 
possible, enhancing the openness of procurement markets; (ii) ensuring good governance and 
deterring corruption in procurement activities; and (iii) promoting the efficient and effective 
management of public resources.  Participation in the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) can assist in responding to all three challenges. 
 
In particular, participation in the GPA provides legal guarantees of access to the 
Parties' "covered" government procurement markets by the goods, services and suppliers of 
all Parties.
3  The usefulness of these guarantees was seen early in the current crisis, when 
elements preserving the rights of GPA Parties' suppliers were included with the "Buy 
American" provisions of the so-called United States stimulus legislation, the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  Specifically, in regard to the two provisions of the 
legislation incorporating new Buy American requirements, the stimulus legislation addressed 
the potential for conflict with the GPA and other U.S. international trade commitments by 
including a further provision stipulating that:  "This section shall be applied in a manner 
consistent with United States obligations under international agreements" (see also World 
Trade Organization 2009, p. 42). 
 
Concerning governance and the management of public resources, the adoption of a 
transparent and competitive procurement system can yield substantial savings for 
governments, in the range of 20-25% of total procurement costs.  It should be noted that 
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maximizing value for money in procurement systems requires attention to two distinct but 
inter-related challenges:  (i) ensuring integrity in the procurement process (i.e., preventing 
corruption on the part of public officials); and (ii) promoting effective competition among 
suppliers, including by preventing collusion among potential bidders.  Participation in the 
GPA can assist in responding to both challenges (Anderson, Kovacic and Müller 2011).  To 
be sure, governments may attempt to implement unilaterally a transparent and competitive 
procurement system, but GPA participation can act as a catalyst for and complement the 
necessary internal reforms (Anderson, Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller 2011). 
 
Currently, a major effort is being made in the WTO Committee on Government 
Procurement to conclude the ongoing renegotiation and modernization of the GPA.  As of the 
time of this writing, prospects appear good for reaching agreement among the Parties, 
possibly before the end of 2011, relating to the coverage of the Agreement (i.e. the market 
access commitments of individual Parties) and the Future Work Programmes of the 
Committee (to be implemented following the conclusion of the present negotiation).  This, in 
turn, would make possible the coming into force of the modernized text of the Agreement 
discussed above. 
 
A key consideration underlying the ongoing effort to conclude the GPA renegotiation 
is the belief that the coming into force of the revised text will facilitate and encourage 
accession to it by additional WTO Members, including emerging and developing countries in 
addition to developed countries.  Currently, forty-two WTO Members are covered by the 
Agreement:  Armenia; Canada; the European Union, with its 27 member States; Hong Kong, 
China; Iceland; Israel; Japan; Korea; Liechtenstein; the Kingdom of the Netherlands with 
respect to Aruba; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; Chinese Taipei and the United States.  
Nine other WTO Members (Albania, China, Georgia, Jordan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
Oman, Panama and Ukraine) have applied for accession to the Agreement and submitted 
relevant documentation.  In addition, a further four Members (Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Mongolia and Saudi Arabia) have provisions in their respective 
WTO Accession Protocols which call for them to seek GPA accession.  Recently, a study 
conducted by staff members of the WTO Secretariat found that accession to the Agreement 
by these and other WTO Members considered in the study could add in the range of $US 6 
 
380-970 billion annually to the total value of the market access commitments under the 
Agreement (Anderson, Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller 2011).
4 
 
Overall, the GPA is clearly in the process of becoming a more central element of the 
multilateral trading system, covering a large and very important field of economic activity.
5  
As such, it is an important success story for the WTO in a difficult time.  The Agreement 
plays an essential role in limiting the scope for implementation of market access restricting 
measures in regard to participating WTO Members' economies.  In addition, by promoting 
fair competition in Members' procurement markets, it contributes importantly to good 
governance and the realization of value for money for governments and their citizens.  These 
roles will be strengthened by conclusion of the present renegotiation and by the expected 
expansion of the membership of the Agreement, over time, to include key emerging and 
developing economies.  Arguably, adherence to principles of reciprocity as called for by 
Bagwell and Staiger (2011) is an important fulcrum of the Agreement's success. 
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